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Alan L Rector, Jeremy Rogers, Adel TaweelAbstract
Previous papers have argued for the existence of three different
models in many clinical information systems – for the medical
record, for inference in guidelines, and for concepts and re-us-
able facts.  This paper presents a principled approach to decid-
ing which information belongs in each model based on the
nature of the queries or inference to be performed: necessary or
contingent, open or closed world, algorithmic vs heuristic.  It
then discusses an important class of systems – “ontologically in-
dexed knowledge bases” – and issues of metadata within this
framework.
Keywords: 
Computerized medical records, knowledge representation, ter-
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Introduction
Two previous papers [1, 2] proposed the thesis that three inter-
acting models are required for clinical systems, as shown in Fig-
ure 1.  Each model describes a distinct type of information
source   
1. The Information Model: what has been observed or
done – the healthcare record
2. The Inference Model: what should be inferred or done –
decision support including guidelines, protocols and
warnings
3. The Concept Model or “Ontology”: what is necessarily
or at least prototypically true – terminology and the
background common knowledge base of anatomy, phys-
iology, etc. 
Principled interfaces are required between the three models.  In
addition, at the centre of their interface is a process of “abstrac-
tion” by which the concrete data – the actual entries in the patient
record – are linked to the other two models according to context.
For example, the criteria for determining whether a patient has
“Asthma” will be different for a drug alert system than for entry
into a controlled clinical trial of asthma patients.  
However, although the existence of the three models has gained
some acceptance and is confirmed by organizational structure of
groups such as HL7, there has not been principled account of the
differences between them nor a clear vocabulary for deciding
which items should be allocated to which model.  Much of the
discussion focuses on the idiosyncrasies of particular technolo-
gies rather than the principles behind the reasoning.
The need for a more principled approach is made acute by a) the
emergence of formal definitions and languages for Archetypes
[3] as re-usable building blocks for healthcare records and the
ISO/CEN efforts on Electronic Healthcare Record Architectures
[4]; b) formal models of guidelines such as GLIF1, ASBRU2,
ProForma3, the HL7 guideline models, and the various efforts to
formalize clinical decision making models; c) the increasing
number of terminology and ontology efforts including
SNOMED-CT4, the National Cancer Institute Center for Bioin-
formatics (NCICB)’s vocabulary resources for CaCore5, and the
Gene Ontology Next Generation 6.
Figure 1 -  Three information models for clinical systems
(adapted from [1, 2])
In addition, the emergence of the Semantic Web7 and the E-Sci-
ence/Grid initiatives8 has stressed the importance of ‘metadata’
describing the history and provenance of the models and the data
they describe.  Hence an extra layer of metadata has been added
to each model in Figure 1 by comparison with the originals.
1.  http://www.glif.org/
2.  http://www.asgaard.tuwien.ac.at/
3.  http://www.openclinical.org
4.  http://www.snsomed.org
5.  http://ncicb.nci.nih.gov/core
6.  http://gong.man.ac.uk/
7.  http://www.semanticweb.org
8.  http://www.rcuk.ac.uk/escience/rclinks.shtml
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AL Rector et al.This paper puts forward three theses, that: 
• The three models are characterized by fundamental dif-
ferences in the reasoning supported
• What we term an “Ontology indexed knowledge base” is
a common feature in the interaction between the ontol-
ogy and other two models
• There are common metadata requirements for all and
that metadata is effectively contingent knowledge.
Reasoning and models
Vocabulary
Before discussing the different types of reasoning, it is useful to
review some key properties of inference and query systems:
• Closed vs open world – in “closed world” reasoning, all
information is assumed to be in the knowledge base or
database; if information cannot be found in this specific
“world”, it is assumed to be false. This behaviour is
often called “negation as failure”. In “open world” rea-
soning, the information available is treated as a set of
axioms in a logical theory to which more might always
be added. Negation is taken as proof of impossibility in
any “world”.  This might be termed, by analogy, “nega-
tion as impossibility”1
• Querying vs inferencing – in querying, all reasoning is
specified in the query itself.  The query may be complex,
but it treats the information as a set of explicit static facts
– “ground clauses” in logicians’ terms; a “database” in
common parlance – from which information is to be
retrieved and processed but which does not contain itself
any means of inference. Any inference must be either a)
precomputed and inserted in the database or b) specified
in the query itself.2  By contrast, in inferencing, the
knowledge base contains rules or axioms that allow con-
clusions to be inferred which are not explicitly present in
the knowledge base.
• Monotonic vs non-monotonic reasoning – in standard
logic, new information can only increase the number of
conclusions that can be drawn.  It can never invalidate
old conclusions, i.e. the number of conclusions (theo-
rems) increases monotonically3.  Any closed world sys-
tem is intrinsically non-monotonic with respect to
negative conclusions, since new information can mean
that the search no longer ‘fails’.  In addition, many
guideline systems allow the revision of previous conclu-
sions on the basis of new evidence – i.e. they use ‘non-
monotonic reasoning’.  
• Algorithmic vs Heuristic - Algorithms are guaranteed to
produce correct answers; Heuristics are rules of thumb
that are useful in solving problems but cannot be guaran-
teed to succeed. 
Types of reasoning in health information systems
Although the above scheme might produce eight possible cells,
there are only three types of reasoning relevant to this discus-
sion:
1. Database Querying – simply querying of a database of
facts without inferencing.  No variables are allowed in
the database; only in queries, and the process is algorith-
mic. No matter how complicated the ‘query’, at base the
key information is simply retrieved from the database if
present. If the information is absent, the query returns an
empty set, i.e. the reasoning is “closed world”. For
example, to query a database for a patient’s ancestors,
either there needs to be an “ancestor” table in the data-
base, or the query itself needs to specify the mechanism
for retrieving an ‘ancestor’.  
2. Contingent inference – searching for answers using sets
of rules in a knowledge base about a particular individ-
ual in the specific world specified by its knowledge base
and database.  The rules in the knowledge base can con-
tain variables.  Reasoning can be either “backwards
chaining” – e.g. Prolog, eMycin, etc. - or “forwards
chaining” – OPS5, CLIPS, JESS, etc.  To follow the
above example, the rules for “ancestor” might be part of
the knowledge base itself, so that the set of ancestors for
an individual could be inferred without a complex query.
Reasoning is “closed world” but often heuristic.  Anyone
about whom there was no information linking them to
the individual in question would be treated as a “non-
ancestor”.  Many contingent inference systems also
include mechanisms for “belief revision” or support for
other forms of non-monotonic reasoning. 
3. Necessary inference – finding what is necessarily true of
any individual of a given type in any “world” consistent
with the system’s axioms.  Most first order logic (FoL)
and all description logic reasoners as used in GALEN,
SNOMED-RT/CT, and OWL-DL use necessary infer-
ence. Reasoning is “open world”, monotonic, and algo-
rithmic. As in contingent reasoning, the axioms
concerning “ancestor” might be in the knowledge base,
so that the class of all of a person’s ancestors could be
inferred.  However, the class of “non-ancestors” would
include only those who were provably not ancestors.
Individuals about whom no information was available
would be treated as neither ancestors nor non-ancestors.  
Reasoning in the three models
The central claim of this paper is that each type of reasoning ap-
plies to the knowledge specified by one of the three models:
1.  Logicians would use the term “unsatisfiability”,  i.e. unsatis-
fiable in any “world” or “model”.  But beware, by “model”, logicians 
mean a set of facts consistent with a set of axioms. This is almost pre-
cisely the converse of what is here termed a “model”: a set of axioms 
(or other formalism) that constrain a set of data or facts. 
2.  “Deductive databases” rather blur this distinction, but can 
most easily be thought of in this framework as a contingent inference 
system tightly coupled to a database query system.
3.  In standard logic, a contradiction implies anything and eve-
rything;  i.e. in an inconsistent system all things can be proven.  Hence 
even adding inconsistent information increases what can be con-
cluded  “monotonically”. (For an explanation see [5]  or any logic text-
book)80
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records.  Ultimately the patient record is simply a collec-
tion of facts about what carers have heard, seen, thought,
and done.  All that can be done is to query it. For exam-
ple “On 02/03/02 Dr. Smith reported that John has diabe-
tes”; “On date 03/04/02 Dr Jones reported that John’s
diabetic control is poor”.  
2. Contingent inference is used to make decisions based on
rules and contingent fact about specific patients, often in
clinical guidelines. Typically, the rules are highly depen-
dent on circumstances and subject to relatively rapid
change and disagreement as knowledge and practice
changes.  It is impractical to perform much inference in
advance because relatively little can be inferred until the
circumstances of an individual patient are known.  Many
rules are heuristic and so their results must be tested in
each case. A typical rule might be: “If diabetes is poorly
controlled, try increasing the insulin dose”.
3. Necessary inference is used to reason about terminology
and necessary domain knowledge.  The knowledge
involved is either definitional – e.g. “pneumonitis” is
defined as an “inflammation of the lungs” – or so deeply
embedded in our common understanding of the world
that we treat it as definitional – e.g. “diabetes is a kind of
metabolic disorder”.  The statements – or “axioms” – are
true of all patients in all worlds consistent with our cur-
rent understanding. Inference is algorithmic and guaran-
teed to succeed. Therefore, it is useful to perform much
inference in advance since the inferences will apply to
all patients whatever the circumstances – e.g. to infer the
is-kind-of hierarchy amongst the concepts defined.
Consequences and crossovers
Abstraction is inference
An immediate consequence of the above discussion is to place
the “abstraction” bubble in Figure 1 clearly in the category of
“Contingent inference”.  Whilst it may be appropriate, even vi-
tal, to hive it off as a separate module, it clearly requires more
than simple database queries but equally does not involve uni-
versals based on definition or the fundamentals of our common
conceptualisation of medicine.  Hence it is likely to use heuris-
tics, rules and contingent inference. 
“Ontology indexed knowledge bases” and re-use
The split between necessary definitional knowledge and contin-
gent knowledge does not always fall naturally in terms of the de-
velopment process.  There is much that is ‘contingent’ which is
nonetheless stable and re-usable across numerous applications –
e.g. the uses and licensing status of drugs, the list of protocols
applicable to a disease in a given hospital, the clinical signifi-
cance of laboratory results, etc. Frequently the natural split in
terms of labour and software architecture is between the “re-us-
able knowledge sources”, which are presumed to be general, and
the individual guidelines, services, procedures, or messages,
which are presumed to be specific.  Authors of specific guide-
lines would like all the general re-usable information stored in
the same place.  Furthermore, as a matter of good software engi-
neering they would like to make the default “fail-safe” behaviour
to be inherited unless over-ridden.  Hence they want this infor-
mation kept together with the universal information in the ontol-
ogy.
In fact, ontologies make indexes to such re-usable contingent in-
formation extremely efficient.  Using the ontology as a “concep-
tual coat rack” on which to hang other contingent knowledge
often results in major simplifications[6, 7]  
However, this entails contingent knowledge to be queried under
a closed world hypothesis rather than necessary knowledge to be
reasoned about under an open world hypothesis. The difference
is not ‘academic’.  Using the wrong reasoning mode gets the
wrong answer!  For example, a query for “drugs used but not li-
censed for the treatment of nausea in chemotherapy” should re-
turn all those drugs for which no license is listed, not just those
for whom it has been specifically stated that they are not li-
censed.  Otherwise it would be necessary to state all of the non-
licensing explicitly – a large and pointless task. 
This leads to a useful test for designers to decide whether a piece
of information is ‘contingent’ or ‘necessary’: “Should the ab-
sence of information be treated as false?”  “Is it practical to com-
pile all of the negative cases explicitly?” If the answer either to
the first question is “yes” or to the second question “no”, then the
information should be treated as “contingent”. 
We term such a combined knowledge base of re-usable contin-
gent facts organised and indexed by an ontology an “Ontology
indexed knowledge base”.  A key feature of GALEN’s GRAIL
language is support for such contingent fact1s. The need for such
information is a key reason for the integration of frame systems
from Protégé with the new web ontology language OWL in the
CO-ODE projec2t.   
Ontology as content and ontology as index
The previous section argued for the use of “ontology indexed
knowledge bases” in order to keep all re-usable information to-
gether.  There is a second, perhaps even more important case for
their use – when providing indexing to composite objects that
cannot be listed exhaustively without producing a combinatorial
explosion.  This use is typical of the relationship between ontol-
ogies and data structures or guidelines.  In this case the ontology
plays a dual role: as index and as content.  
Figure 2 illustrates this mechanism. The composite notion of
“Template for Renin dependent hypertension at St Stevens Hos-
pitals for the National hypertension survey” is formed and clas-
sified logically to place it correctly in the hierarchy as shown.
The structure and position of the items for the template are ‘in-
herited’ as in a frame system – systolic & diastolic blood pres-
sure from “hypertension”, “serum potassium” from “renin
dependent hypertension”, etc.  The meaning of those items refers
back to different branches (modules) of the ontology.  The fact
that they are all represented in one ontology, governed by con-
sistent logical rules, guarantees that the combined notion is cor-
rectly placed. Because the ontology is “normalised” conflicts in 
1.  termed “extrinsics” in GRAIL for historical reasons
2.  http://www.co-ode.org81
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 inheritance – “Nixon diamonds” - are rare.  This was the funda-
mental mechanism behind the PEN&PAD system [8].. 
Metadata and Provenance
Metadata is traditionally described as “data about data”.  We can
divide metadata into two classes:
• Metadata about the representation – e.g. editorial infor-
mation about how this information came to be in this
form in the knowledge base or EHR.
• Metadata about the actual information itself – who first
described a disease or disease class, whether the concept
is current or outmoded, etc. 
The second case, metadata about the actual information, is be-
yond the scope of this paper.  The first case, metadata about the
representation is a major feature of both Electronic Healthcare
Records and most guideline systems.  For example the GEM
measures of guideline quality are largely concerned with the
metadata – who compiled the guideline, from what authority,
how thoroughly it has been tested, etc.  Much of the medical
record consists of metadata about who has responsibility for de-
cisions and data.  
Such metadata is almost always contingent.  In fact it can be con-
sidered as simple ground statements about the data objects them-
selves qua data objects.  As such, it is information which we
expect to query under a closed world hypothesis rather than use
in inferring classification under an open world hypothesis.  For
example, when using the Dublin Core1, which widely used for
holding reference information for digital libraries, when asking
about plays written by Gilbert but not Sullivan, I would expect
to get back those on which only Gilbert’s name appears.  I would
not expect to have to have listed explicitly that they were not
written by Sullivan.  The same will be true when looking, in a
parallel example, for concepts which appear in SNOMED-CT
but not ICD-10, or for entries in the record which were not made
by a junior doctor.  The issue is important because the role of
such metadata statements controversial even within the stan-
dards debates around the new web ontology language, OWL. 
Discussion
It is frequently unclear which of the three models should contain
which information. As the formalisms used in each model be-
come more expressive, this problem becomes more common
rather than less, because at least superficially, more things can be
represented in any of the three models.  The expressiveness of
the new web ontology language, OWL, is therefore a potential
hazard as well as a benefit.
Some choices will, inevitably, be pragmatic.  However, in oth-
ers, these criteria at least give a basis for argument.  For example,
consider whether the classification of patients as having rheuma-
toid arthritis on the basis of having at least five out of the seven
criteria on the American Rheumatology Association scale. The
new web ontology language, OWL, is powerful enough to ex-
press this notion2.  However, is what we really want to say:
“Necessarily, anyone having five of these symptoms has rheu-
matoid arthritis” with the same strength that we say: “Necessar-
ily, anyone who has rheumatoid arthritis has an autoimmune
disease”?  Almost certainly not.  International differences in the
criteria for the diagnosis of rheumatoid arthritis exist precisely
because we do not have a sufficient understanding to make such
a strong statement.  Nor do they hold without exception.  It is not
contradictory to find a patient who fails these criteria but whom
we still believe to have rheumatoid arthritis, merely unusual.
Hence diagnosis via such criteria is contingent reasoning and be-
longs in the inference model.
By contrast, consider “Idiopathic hypertension”.  The notion of
idiopathic hypertension really is defined by having no demon-
1.  http://dublincore.org/
2.  Awkwardly in version 1, but easily in likely subsequent versions 
which will include “Qualified number restrictions”82
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pathic hypertension” just because no cause is recorded, but only
when they have been investigated and shown to have no plausi-
ble cause. Hence, the notion is definitional and the reasoning
“open world”.  Therefore, the definition of idiopathic hyperten-
sion is necessary inference and belongs in the concept model.
Finally, consider the issue of how best to handle a set of data el-
ements – archetypes, templates, or data entry forms, etc. If there
is a well defined modest number of these elements, then individ-
ual enumeration is sufficient and the use of an “Ontology in-
dexed knowledge base” is unnecessary.  If the total potential
number is combinatorially large but the number of the actually
defined is modest, then an “Ontology indexed knowledge base”
is a plausible solution.
Whatever the choice, the questions: “Do I need simple queries or
complex inference?”,  “Is it contingent or necessary?”,  “Is the
reasoning closed or open world?”, “Is the indexing liable to com-
binatorial explosion?” provide a framework for rational discus-
sion.
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